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Correlation-Based Traffic Analysis Attacks
on Anonymity Networks
Ye Zhu, Member, IEEE, Xinwen Fu, Member, IEEE, Bryan Gramham, Member, IEEE,
Riccardo Bettati, Member, IEEE, and Wei Zhao, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we address attacks that exploit the timing behavior of TCP and other protocols and applications in low-latency
anonymity networks. Mixes have been used in many anonymous communication systems and are supposed to provide
countermeasures to defeat traffic analysis attacks. In this paper, we focus on a particular class of traffic analysis attacks, flowcorrelation attacks, by which an adversary attempts to analyze the network traffic and correlate the traffic of a flow over an input link
with that over an output link. Two classes of correlation methods are considered, namely time-domain methods and frequency-domain
methods. Based on our threat model and known strategies in existing mix networks, we perform extensive experiments to analyze the
performance of mixes. We find that all but a few batching strategies fail against flow-correlation attacks, allowing the adversary to
either identify ingress and egress points of a flow or to reconstruct the path used by the flow. Counterintuitively, some batching
strategies are actually detrimental against attacks. The empirical results provided in this paper give an indication to designers of Mix
networks about appropriate configurations and mechanisms to be used to counter flow-correlation attacks.
Index Terms—Privacy, mixes, anonymity, anonymous communication, flow-correlation attack.
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INTRODUCTION

A

S the

Internet is increasingly used in all aspects of daily
life, the realization has emerged that privacy and
confidentiality are important requirements for the success
of many applications. It has been shown that, in many
situations, encryption alone cannot provide the level of
confidentiality required by users, since traffic analysis can
easily uncover information about the participants in a
distributed application.
User anonymity is one important confidentiality criterion
for many applications, ranging from peer-to-peer file
sharing and anonymous web browsing or e-mail, to various
forms of electronic commerce, and finally to electronic
voting. The nature of many such applications requires that
the identity of either one or more of the participants
remains confidential either from the other participant(s) or
from third parties.
The anonymity of a system can be passively attacked by
an observer in two ways, either through inspection of
payload or headers of the exchanged data packets, or, when
encryption is used, through traffic analysis. Sufficiently
effective encryption can be used to prevent packet content
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inspection, giving prevalence to the second form of attack.
Traffic analysis is typically countered by the use of
intermediary nodes, whose role is to perturb the traffic
flow and thus confuse an external observer. Such inter
mediaries (often called mixes) delay and reroute exchanged
messages, reorder them, pad their size, or perform other
operations. Chaum [1] proposed such a mix network to
handle mail traffic.
The original Chaum mix network operates on entire mail
messages at a time and therefore does not need to pay
particular attention to latency added by the mixes. Increas
ingly, the data exchanged exceed by far the capacity of
mixes, for example, in file-sharing applications. As a result,
current mixes operate on individual packets of a flow rather
than on entire messages. In conjunction with source routing
at the sender, this allows for very efficient network-level
implementations of mix networks.
Mixes are also being used in applications where low
latency is relevant, for example, voice-over-IP or video
streaming. Many other applications, such as traditional FTP
or file-sharing applications, rely on delay-sensitive proto
cols, such as TCP, and are therefore in turn delay-sensitive
as well. For such applications, it is well known that the level
of traffic perturbation caused by the mix network must be
carefully chosen in order to not unduly affect delay and
throughput requirements of the applications. For the
designer of the anonymity system, this results in a tradeoff between the anonymity degree [2], [3], [4] and quality
of-service (QoS).
Although significant efforts have been put forth in
researching anonymous communication since Chaum, only
recently have systematic studies appeared to quantitatively
capture the effect of traffic perturbation on the anonymity in
realistic settings. It is, therefore, difficult to assess the
improvement of anonymity that one attains for any given

cost in form of added latency and perturbation to traffic
streams. Moreover, few quantitative guidelines exist on
how different perturbation mechanisms perform.
This paper focuses on the quantitative evaluation of mix
performance. We focus our analysis on a particular type of
attack, which we call the flow-correlation attack. In general,
flow-correlation attacks attempt to reduce the anonymity
degree by estimating the path of flows through the mix
network. Flow correlation analyzes the traffic on a set of
links (observation points) inside the network and estimates
the likelihood for each link to be on the path of the flow
under consideration. An adversary analyzes the network
traffic with the intention of identifying which of several
output ports a flow at an input port of a mix is taking.
Obviously, flow correlation helps the adversary identify the
path of a flow and consequently reveal other critical
information related to the flow (e.g., sender and receiver).
Our major contributions are summarized as follows:
1.

2.

3.

We formally model the behavior of an adversary
who launches flow-correlation attacks. In order to
successfully identify the path taken by a particular
flow, the attacker measures the dependency of
traffic flows. Two classes of correlation methods
are considered, namely time-domain methods and
frequency-domain methods. In the time domain, for
example, statistical information about rate distribu
tions is collected and used to identify the traffic
dependency. Similarly, in the frequency domain, we
identify traffic similarities by comparing the Fourier
spectra of timing data. Our experiments indicate that
mixes with many currently used batching strategies
are weak against flow-correlation attacks, in the
sense that attackers can easily determine the path
taken by a protected flow.
We measure the effectiveness of a number of popular
mix strategies in countering flow-correlation attacks.
Mixes with any tested batching strategy may fail
under flow-correlation attacks in the sense that, for a
given flow over an input link, the adversary can
effectively detect which output link is used by the
same flow. We use detection rate, the probability that
the adversary correctly correlates flows into and out
of a mix, defined as the measure of success for the
attack. We will show that, given a sufficient amount of
data, known mix strategies fail; that is, the attack
achieves close to 100 percent detection rate. This
remains true even in batching strategies that sacrifice
QoS (such as a significant TCP goodput reduction) in
favor of security.
While many mix strategies rely on other mechanisms
in addition to batching alone, it is important to
understand the vulnerabilities of batching. In fact,
for a given accuracy of the collected data, the
effectiveness of such attacks depends primarily on
the amount of collected data, i.e., on the length of the
observation interval. In our experiments, we illus
trate this dependency between attack effectiveness
for various batching strategies and the amount of
data at hand. These results should guide designers
of anonymous communication systems in the in
formed choice of strategy parameters, such as for
striping or for path rerouting [5].

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 outlines our Mix
network model, threat model, and a formal definition of the
problem. Batching strategies used by existing mix networks
are also discussed in this section. Section 4 introduces traffic
analysis methodologies that may be deployed by an
adversary. We consider both time-domain and frequencydomain traffic analysis methods. In Section 5, we evaluate the
performance of mix batching strategies in terms of detection
rate and FTP goodput. We also examine the performance of
large collections of mixes (so-called mix networks). The
effectiveness of the described flow-correlation attacks de
pends on how packet rates are sampled. In Section 6, we
empirically compare the effectiveness of the attacks for
different sampling intervals and theoretically derive optimal
intervals.
We conclude the paper and discuss the future work in
Section 7.

2

RELATED WORK

Chaum [1] pioneered the idea of anonymous communica
tion in 1981. Since then, researchers have applied the idea to
different applications such as message-based e-mail and
flow-based low-latency communications, and they have
developed new defense techniques as more attacks have
been proposed.
For anonymous e-mail applications, Chaum [1] proposed
using relay servers, called mixes, which encrypt and reroute
messages. An encrypted message is analogous to an onion
constructed by a sender, who sends the onion to the first mix:
Using its private key, the first mix peels off the first
layer, which is encrypted using the public key of the
first mix.
2. Inside the first layer is the second mix’s address and
the rest of the onion, which is encrypted with the
second mix’s public key.
3. After getting the second mix’s address, the first mix
forwards the peeled onion to the second mix. This
process repeats all the way to the receiver.
4. The core part of the onion is the receiver’s address
and the real message to be sent to the receiver by the
last mix.
Chaum proposed return address and digital pseudonyms
for users to communicate with each other anonymously.
Low-latency anonymous communication can be further
divided into systems using core mix networks and those
using peer-to-peer networks. In a system using a core mix
network, users connect to a pool of mixes, which provide
anonymous communication, and users select a forwarding
path through this core network to the receiver. Onion
routing [6], Freedom [7], and—most prominently—TOR [8]
belong to this category. In a system using a peer-to-peer
network, every node in the network is a mix, but it can also
be a sender and receiver. Obviously, a peer-to-peer mix
network can be very large and may provide better
anonymity in the case when many participants use the
anonymity service and enough traffic is generated around
the network. Crowds [9], Tarzan [10], MorphMix [11], and P 5
[12] belong to this category.
1.

This paper is interested in the study of passive traffic
analysis attacks against low-latency anonymous commu
nication systems. Sun et al. [13] give a quantitative analysis
for identifying a web page despite the use of encryption and
anonymizing proxies. The authors take advantage of the fact
that a number of HTTP features, such as the number and size
of objects, can be used as signatures to identify web pages
with some accuracy. Unless the anonymizer addresses this,
these signatures are visible to the adversary. Serjantov and
Sewell [14] analyzed the possibility of a lone flow along an
input link of a mix. If the rate of this lone input flow is
roughly equal to the rate of a flow out of the mix, this pair of
input flow and outflow flow are correlated. They also briefly
discussed some of the possible traffic features used to trace a
flow. In [15], Wright et al. analyze passive logging attacks on
anonymous communication networks.
Attacks on low-latency anonymity networks can be
classified into two categories, depending on whether they
have access to the information about individual flows in the
network or not. The attacks belonging to the first category
assume that timing information about individual flows is
available either from compromised mix nodes [16] or from a
corrupt server [17]. The attacks proposed in the second
category aim to match a known traffic flow with sets of
aggregate flows, typically aggregate traffic through two or
more outgoing ports. Danezis’s attack [18] on continuoustime mix belongs to this category. Danezis proposed using
likelihood ratios to detect a flow in aggregate traffic. To
calculate the likelihood ratios, the adversaries need to know
the information of cross traffic. The attacks we will present
later in this paper belong to the second category. The
proposed attack relies on the dependency between the flow
of interest and aggregate flows containing the flow of
interest. In comparison with Danezis’s attack [18], the attacks
proposed in this paper do not require information about
cross traffic. In addition, we will show how these attacks
remain effective in the presence of large amounts of noise.
Two recent attacks on large-scale anonymity networks
illustrate the effectiveness of traffic analysis in practice. In
[17], Murdoch and Danezis stage an active attack to trace
back connections from a server to the victim client by
modulating the traffic to the victim at the server and by
remotely “sensing” the modulation by probind its inter
ference on cross traffic that is generated by one or more
corrupt Tor nodes. Similarly, Øverlier and Syverson [19],
[20] describe how to locate hidden servers in the Tor
network with the use of a corrupt Tor node and a client
node. It is pointed out that all Tor nodes are volunteer
peers; it is easy to add corrupt nodes to the network.
With the realization that attacks on anonymity networks
are varied, easy to deploy, and effective, attention has started
to focus on trying to understand the fundamental capabilities
of anonymity infrastructures. Kesdogan et al. [21] use
information-theoretic arguments to quantify limitations on
the attack resistance of mix networks. Similarly, Zhu and
Bettati [4] quantify the effect of imperfect mix implementa
tions using information-theoretic means. Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya [22] give a cryptographic definition of onion
routing, which in turn allows the construction of secure
onion routing schemes.
Correlation-based traffic analysis schemes are applicable
beyond anonymity networks. For example, traffic analysis
has been successfully applied to identify and locate

Fig. 1. A single mix.

stepping stones [23], [24], [25]. Most of these traffic analysis
approaches are timing based. Similarly, Suh et al. use traffic
correlation in the time domain to identify Skype relay nodes
at the boundary of campus network settings [26]. Active
approaches based on embedding watermark into traffic
flows are proposed to detect stepping stones in [24], [25].

3

MODELS

3.1 Mix and Mix Network
A mix is a relay device for anonymous communication.
Fig. 1 shows a situation where users communicate using a
single mix. such a single mix can achieve a certain level of
communication anonymity: The sender of a message
attaches the receiver address to a packet and encrypts it
using the mix’s public key. Upon receiving a packet, a mix
decodes the packet. Different from an ordinary router, a
mix usually will not relay the received packet immediately.
Rather, it collects several packets and then sends them out
in a batch. The order of packets may be altered as well.
Techniques such as batching and reordering are simple
means to perturb the timing behavior of packets across a
mix, which in turn is considered necessary for mixes to
prevent timing-based attacks. More sophisticated perturba
tion techniques, such as continuous mixes, have been
recently described, but have been shown to be susceptible
to flow-correlation attacks as well [27]. The main objective
of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of mixes against
a special class of timing-based attacks. Some mix networks
(most notably maybe Tor) do not explicitly batch packets at
the mixes, but rather perturb traffic patterns implicitly by
running TCP-style feedback-based protocols between
mixes. In this paper, we limit our attention to mix
networks with explicit batching.
A mix network, such as Onion Routing network or Tor
Network, consists of multiple mixes that are interconnected
by a network. Such a mix network may provide enhanced
anonymity, as payload packets may go through multiple
mixes. Since the end-to-end performance of any mix
network eventually relies on the performance of its
individual mixes, the analysis of the single mix provides a
foundation for analyzing the end-to-end performance of
mix networks. We discuss in detail how to extend our work
to larger and complicated mix networks in [28]. In fact, if we
view a mix network (for example, any portion of a Tor
network [8]) as one super mix, the analytical techniques in
this paper can be directly applied.
3.2 Batching Strategies for a Mix
Batching strategies are designed to prevent not only simple
timing analysis attacks, but also powerful trickle attacks,

TABLE 1
Batching Strategies [30]

flood attacks, and many other forms of attacks [29], [30].
Serjantov et al. [30] summarizes seven batching strategies
that have been proposed. We will evaluate each of these
strategies. Our results show that these strategies may not
work under certain timing analysis attacks. These seven
batching strategies are listed in Table 1, in which batching
strategies from s1 to s4 are denoted as simple mixes, while
batching strategies from s5 to s7 are denoted as pool mixes.
From Table 1, we can see that the sending of a batch of
packets can be triggered by certain events, e.g., queue
length reaching a predefined threshold, a timer having a
time-out, or some combination of these two.
Batching is typically accompanied by reordering. In this
paper, the attacks focus on the traffic characteristics. As
reordering does not significantly change packet interarrival
times for mixes that use batching, these attacks (and our
analysis thereof) are unaffected by reordering. Thus, our
results are applicable to systems that use any kind of
reordering methods. More precisely, reorderings are in all
cases caused by packets being delayed by the batcher, and can
therefore be handled by modifying the batching algorithm
accordingly. In this paper, we deal with a large class of
batching strategies, and the rest have (such as the Continuous
Mix [18]) been discussed by others. As such, in the rest of this
paper, we will not discuss reordering techniques further.
Any of the batching strategies can be implemented in
two ways:
Link-Based Batching. With this method, each output
link has a separate queue. A newly arrived packet is put
into a queue depending on its destination (and hence the
link associated with the queue). Once a batch is ready from
a particular queue (per the batching strategy), the packets
are taken out of the queue and transmitted over the
corresponding link.
Mix-Based Batching. In this way, the entire mix has only
one queue. The selected batching strategy is applied to this
queue. That is, once a batch is ready (per the batching

strategy), the packets are taken out the queue and
transmitted over links based on the packets’ destination.
Each of these two methods has its own advantages and
disadvantages. The control of link-based batching is
distributed inside the mix and hence may have good
efficiency. On the other hand, mix-based batching uses only
one queue and hence is easier to manage. We consider both
methods in this paper.

3.3 Threat Model
In this paper, we assume that the adversary uses a classical
timing analysis attack [31], [32], which we summarize as
follows:
We assume a partially global adversary, who can observe
some (i.e., wherever he can place a monitoring point) but
not necessarily all links of a mix network. We also assume
that the mix nodes of interest are not compromised (as
opposed to, for example, Levine et al.’s work [16]) but
maybe other nodes are, and that the adversary is interested
in breaking the anonymity provided by the mix network.
The adversary collects the packet interarrival times, and
analyzes them. This type of attack is passive, since traffic is
not actively altered (by, say, dropping, inserting, and/or
modifying packets during a communication session), and is
therefore very difficult to detect. This type of attack can be
easily staged on wired and wireless links [33] by a variety of
agents that have access to the network infrastructure, such
as malicious ISPs or governments [34]. The inherently
distributed nature of many anonymity networks makes it
easy to access such information. For example, malicious Tor
nodes can be used as traffic monitoring points inside the
network. We assume that the traffic characteristic of the
flow under consideration (the input flow) is known. This can
be the case, for example, when the flow traffic characteristic
is indeed observable on a link either inside or at the edge of
the mix network. We assume that the input flow is a single
flow that cannot be split further.

The Mix network topology and the general Mix
strategies are known to the adversary. This is a natural
assumption for many overlay mix networks. As we will
point out in the following, there is no need for the attacker
to know the detailed perturbation scheme used in the Mix,
as our flow-correlation schemes work for just about any
Mix, such as timed and batched mixes, and pooled and
stop-and-go mixes. This is in contrast to Danezis’ elegant
attack to the Continuous Mix [18], which relies on the
pairwise independence of packet timings across flows,
which is not the case in most Mixes.
The adversary cannot correlate (based on packet timing,
content, or size) a packet on a input link to another packet
on the output link. Packet correlation based on packet
timing is prevented by batching, and correlation based on
content and packet size is prevented by encryption and
packet padding, respectively.
To simplify the following discussion, we assume that the
traffic in the mix network is not padded with any dummy
traffic in addition to that naturally generated by the other
users in the network. Some of the modern anonymous
communication systems such as Tor [8], do not use dummy
traffic because of its heavy consumption of bandwidth and
the general lack of understanding of to what extent exactly
dummy packets contribute to anonymity. Rather, they rely
on naturally occurring cross traffic.
Given the threat model described above, we formulate
the Flow-Correlation Problem as follows: Given a description
of a flow of interest at the input of a Mix, and a number of
flows of indistinguishable packets at the outputs of the Mix,
which output link contains the flow of interest? In other
words, we assume that the specific objective of the
adversary is to identify the output link of a traffic flow
that appears on an input link. Others have described similar
attacks but under simplified circumstances. Serjantov and
Sewell [14], for example, assume that the flow under attack
is alone on a link thus making its traffic characteristics
immediately visible to the attacker. In this paper, we
consider flows inside (potentially large) aggregates, thus
making the attack rather generally applicable.

4

TRAFFIC FLOW CORRELATION TECHNIQUES

This section discusses the traffic flow-correlation techniques
that may be used by the adversary either to correlate
senders and receivers directly or to greatly reduce the
searching time for such a correlation in a mix network.

4.1 Overview
Recall that the adversary’s objective is to correlate an
incoming flow to an output link at a Mix. We call this flow
correlation. This flow-correlation attack is harmful in a
variety of situations. For example, in the single-mix scenario
depicted in Fig. 1, the adversary can discover whom sender
(say, S1 ) is talking to (R1 or R2 in this case) by correlating
the output traffic at the Mix to S1 ’s traffic despite cross
traffic from S2 or other senders. In a mix network, the
adversary can easily reconstruct the path of the connection
by combining measurements and results of flow correlation
either at the network boundaries or within the network.
This section discusses the attack in more detail. Fig. 2
shows a flowchart of the typical procedure which the
adversary may use to perform flow correlation. We now
describe each step in detail.

Fig. 2. Typical flowchart for flow correlation.

Step 1: Data Collection. We assume that the adversary is
able to collect information about all the packets on both
input and output links. For each collected packet, the arrival
time is recorded using tools such as tcpdump [35] or Cisco’s
NetFlow [36]. We assume that all the packets are encrypted
and padded to the same size, and hence, only the arrival
time is of interest. The arrival times of packets at input link i
form a time series
Ai ¼ ðai;1 ; . . . ; ai;r Þ;

ð1Þ

where ai;k is the kth packet’s arrival time at input link i, and
r is the size of the sample collected during a given sampling
interval. Similarly, the arrival times of packets at output link
j form a time series
Bj ¼ ðbj;1 ; . . . ; bj;s Þ;

ð2Þ

where bj;k is the kth packet’s arrival time at output link j,
and s is the size of the sample collected during a given
sampling interval. The packets come out from mixes in
batches. We select sampling interval that is usually much
longer than the duration of a batch. Hence, a sampling
interval typically contains many batches. We make the
simplifying assumption that the traffic characteristic of the
flow under consideration (the input flow) is known. This can
be the case, for example, when the flow traffic characteristic
is indeed observable on a link either inside or at the edge of
the mix network.
Step 2: Flow Pattern Vector Extraction. With the above
notation, the strategy of the adversary is to analyze the time
series Ai s and Bj s in order to determine if there is any
dependency between an input flow and an output flow of
the mix. However, a direct analysis over these time series
will not be effective. They need to be transformed into socalled pattern vectors that can facilitate further analysis. We
have found that effective transformation depends on
batching strategies utilized by the mix. In Section 4.2, we
will discuss specific definitions of transformations for
different batching strategies. Currently, for the convenience
of discussion, let us assume that Ai is transformed into
pattern vector Xi ¼ ðxi;1 ; . . . ; xi;q Þ. And time series Bj is
transformed into Yj ¼ ðyj;1 ; . . . ; yj;q Þ. Note, here the two
pattern vectors have the same length.
Step 3: Distance Function Selection. We define the
distance function dðXi ; Yj Þ, which measures the “distance”
between an input flow at input link i and the traffic at
output link j. The smaller the distance, the more likely the
flow on an input link is correlated to the corresponding

flow on the output link. Clearly, the definition of the
distance function is the key in the correlation analysis.
Section 4.3 will discuss two effective distance functions: one
is based on mutual information and the other is based on
the frequency-spectrum-based matched filter.
Step 4: Flow Correlation. Once the distance function has
been defined between an input flow and an output link, we
can easily carry out the correlation analysis by selecting the
output link whose traffic has the minimum distance to
input flow pattern vector Xi .

4.2 Flow Pattern Vector Extraction
Once the data are collected, the relevant pattern vectors
must be extracted. Recall that batching strategies in Table 1
can be classified into two classes: threshold-triggered
batching (s1 , s3 , and s5 )1 and timer-triggered batching (s2 ,
s4 , s6 , and s7 ). The packet timing characteristics at the
output link allows for targeted feature extraction for these
different classes of batching.
For threshold-triggered batching strategies, packets
leave the mix in batches. Hence, the interarrival time of
packets in a batch is determined by the link bandwidth,
which is independent of the input flow. Thus, the useful
information to the adversary is the number of packets in a
batch and the time that elapses between two batches.
Normalizing this relationship, we define the elements in
pattern vector Yj as follows:
Yj;k ¼

Number of packets in batch k in the sampling interval
:
ðEnding time of batch kÞ-ðEnding time of batch k-1Þ
ð3Þ

For timer-triggered batching strategies, a batch of
packets is sent whenever a timer fires. The length of the
time interval between two consecutive timer events is a
predefined constant. Thus, following a similar argument
made for the threshold-triggered batching strategies, we
define the elements in pattern vector Yj as follows:
Yj;k ¼

Number of packets in the kth time-out interval
ðtime of kth time-outÞ-ðtime of ðk - 1Þst time-outÞ
ð4Þ
th

¼

Number of packets in the k time out interval
:
Predefined inter-time-out length

ð5Þ

For the traffic without batching (i.e., the baseline strategy
s0 defined in Table 1), we use similar methods defined for
timer-triggered batching strategies as shown in (5).
The basic idea in the methods for extraction of pattern
vectors is to partition a sampling interval into multiple
subintervals and to calculate the average traffic rate in each
subinterval as the values of the elements of traffic pattern
vectors. The above two methods differ on how to partition
the interval, depending on which batching strategy is used
by the mix. We take a similar approach to extract pattern
vectors Xi s corresponding to Yj s. Again, the specific
method of subinterval partition depends on how the mix
is batching the packets.
1. Strategy s3 could also be classified as timer-triggered. However, we
treat it as threshold-triggered because it may send out a batch when the
number of packets received by the mix has reached the threshold.

4.3 Distance Functions
The feature vectors are correlated using distance functions.
In the following, we consider two kinds of distance
functions: the first is based on a comparison of mutual
information and the second on frequency analysis. The
motivation and computation methods are given below.
4.3.1 Mutual Information
Mutual information is an information theoretical measure
of the dependence of two random variables.2 In our
scenario, we can view the pattern vectors that represent
the input and output flows as samples of random variables.
If we consider the pattern vectors Xi and Yj to be each a
sample of the random variables X i and Y j , respectively,
then fðXi;1 ; Yj;1 Þ; . . . ; ðXi;q ; Yj;q Þg correspond to a sample of
the joint random variable ðX i ; Y j Þ. With these definitions,
the distance dðXi ; Yj Þ between pattern vectors Xi and Yj
should be approximately inversely proportional to the
mutual information IðX i ; Y j Þ between X i and Y j ,
dðXi ; Yj Þ ¼

1
1
¼ -R R
:
pðxi ;yj Þ
IðX i ; Y i Þ
pðxi ; yj Þ log pðxi Þpðy
Þ
j

ð6Þ

In order to compute the mutual information IðX i ; Y i Þ, we
need to estimate the marginal distributions (pðxi Þ and pðyj Þ)
and their joint distribution pðxi ; yj Þ. In the following, we use
a histogram-based estimation of mutual information
^ i ; Y j Þ of continuous distributions [37], which is given
IðX
as follows:
^ i; YjÞ
IðX

X Kuv
u;v

q

log

Kuv q
;
Ku: K:v

ð7Þ

where K represents the histogram, q is the sample size, i.e.,
the length of pattern vector Xi and Yj . The sample space is a
two-dimensional plane divided into U x V equally sized
6X x 6Y cells with coordinates ðu; vÞ. Kuv is the number of
samples in the bin ðu; vÞ. 6X and 6Y have to be carefully
chosen for an optimal estimation.

4.3.2 Frequency Analysis
For timer-triggered batching strategies, we use FFT3 or
Wavelet on the sample Xi and Yj to obtain the frequency
spectrum XiF and YjF . Then, we apply matched filter
method over XiF and YjF . We take advantage of the fact that
frequency components of the input flow traffic carry on to
the aggregate flows at the output link. Matched filter is an
optimal filter to detect a signal buried in noise. It is optimal
in the sense that it can provide the maximum signal-to
noise ratio at its output for a given signal. In particular, by
directly applying the theory of matched filters, we can
define the distance function dðXi ; Yj Þ as the inverse matched
filter detector MðXiF ; YjF Þ,
2. Entropy, an information theoretical measure of uncertainty, was
proposed to measure anonymity degree of anonymity networks in [2], [3].
In [4], we proposed to use mutual information as a measure of anonymity
degree. Entropy is used to measure uncertainty of one random variable and
mutual information is used to measure the dependency between two
random variables.
3. Frequency analysis has been applied to traffic analysis before, e.g., in
[38].

Fig. 3. Experiment setup.

dðXi ; Yj Þ ¼

1
1
( F F) ¼ F F ;
<X
i ;Yj >
M X i ; Yj

ð8Þ

kYjF k

where <XiF ; YjF > is the inner product of XiF and YjF , and
qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
YjF ¼ <YjF ; YjF >:
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EMPIRICAL EVALUATION

We evaluate in a testbed, the effectiveness of a selection of
batching strategies (listed in Table 1) for a mix under our
flow-correlation attacks. These experiments illustrate that
all analyzed batching strategies largely fail under the
attacks described here. In addition, they impose signifi
cant cost on applications, for example, by reducing TCP
flow performance.

5.1 Experiment Network Setup
Fig. 3 shows our experimental testbed. The Mix control
module that performs the batching and reordering func
tions is integrated into Linux’s firewall system [39] using
Netfilter; we use a set of firewall rules to specify what traffic
should be protected. Traditional Linux kernels have a
10 msec timer granularity, which makes an high-fidelity
implementation of timer-based batching strategies difficult.
We use a version of Linux (Timesys/Real Time Linux [40])
that guarantees highly accurate timer behavior (maximum

timer latency around 50 fsec). Two delay boxes D1 and D2
emulate the Internet propagation delay on different paths.
Our experiments reported here focus on TCP flows
because of their prevalence in the Internet. However, the
results are generally applicable to many other kinds of flows
that either use TCP-like congestion control mechanisms or
otherwise display strong timing “footprints” due to, for
example, user dynamics. VoIP flows or sessions with “short”
HTTP connections are instances of the latter. Given the same
amount data, they are in general easier to correlate than the
long-lasting TCP connections analyzed in this paper.
The traffic flows in our experiments are configured as
follows: An FTP client on node R2 downloads a file from the
FTP server on S2 . We call this traffic flow the flow of interest.
In our experiments, this flow carries packets at a rate of
100 packets per second (pps). The traffic from S1 to R2 serves
as the random noise traffic to the FTP client. The traffic from
node S1 to node R1 is the cross traffic through mix M from
the perspective of the FTP flow. We adjust the rate of cross
traffic and of the noise traffic so that the traffic rate on both
output links of the mix are approximately 500 pps. The
objective of the adversary in this experiment is to identify
the output link that carries the FTP flow.

5.2 Metrics
We use detection rate as a measure of the ability of the mix to
protect anonymity. Detection rate here is defined as the ratio
of the number of correct detections to the number of attempts.
While the detection rate measures the effectiveness of the mix
(the lower the detection rate, the more effective the mix), we
measure its efficiency in terms of QoS perceived by the
applications. We use FTP goodput as an indication of FTP QoS.
FTP goodput is defined as the rate at which the FTP client R2
receives data from the FTP server S2 . Low levels of FTP
goodput indicate that the mix in the given configuration is
poorly applicable for low-latency flow-based mix networks.
5.3

Performance Evaluation

5.3.1 Effectiveness of Batching Strategies
Fig. 4 shows the detection rate for systems using a linkbased batching strategy. Fig. 5 shows the detection rate for
systems using a mix-based batching strategy as a function
of the number of packets observed. A sample may include
both FTP packets and cross traffic packets while FTP
packets account for less than 20 percent of the number
(sample size) of packets. Parameters in the legends of these

Fig. 4. Detection rate for link-based batching. (a) Mutual information. (b) Matched filter.

Fig. 5. Detection rate for mix-based batching. (a) Mutual information. (b) Matched filter.

Fig. 6. FTP goodput. (a) Link-based batching. (b) Mix-based batching.

figures are listed in the same order as in Table 1. Based on
these results, we make the following observations:
1.

2.

3.

For all the strategies, the detection rate monotonically
increases with increasing amount of available data.
The detection rate approaches 100 percent when the
sample size is sufficiently large. This is consistent
with intuition, as more data imply that there is more
information about the input flow, which in turn
improves the detection rate. In this set of experi
ments, the detection rate for random guesses is 0.5.
Different strategies display different resistances to
flow-correlation attacks. A number of observations
contradict intuition: a) The simple proxy strategy s0
performs comparatively well in terms of countering
the attack. b) Some researchers in previous studies
argued that pool mixes (strategies s5 -s7 ) perform
better than simple mixes (strategies s1 -s4 ) in mes
sage-based mix networks. Our results empirically
show that this argument does not hold for lowlatency flow-based mix networks. With our current
parameter setting, the best pool batching strategy,
timed dynamic-pool mix (strategy s7 ) for messagebased mix networks is almost the worst one for lowlatency flow-based mix networks under the attack
using mutual information. One of the reasons for
these nonintuitive results is that batching introduces
more dynamics into TCP flows and makes each TCP
flow’s features stand out compared with the back
ground traffic.
Frequency-analysis-based distance functions typi
cally outperform mutual-information-based distance

functions in terms of detection rate. For many
batching strategies, the former performs significantly
better. This is because the frequency-based analysis is
resilient to phasing. Therefore, lack of synchroniza
tion between data collected at input and output ports
has some effect on the effectiveness of the attack.
4. We do not find a significant difference between linkbased and mix-based batching.
Overall, our data show that the mix using any of
batching strategies s1 ; s2 ; . . . ; s7 fails under the flowcorrelation attacks. One of the reasons is that TCP flows
often demonstrate interesting patterns, such as periodicity
of rate change and burstiness, in particular, when the TCP
loop-control mechanism is triggered by excessive traffic
perturbation in the mixes. Figs. 4 and 5 show that flowcorrelation attacks can well explore this pattern difference
between TCP flows.

5.3.2 Efficiency of Batching Strategies
As batching delays packets, one should expect that the
overall performance (in terms of throughput) of TCP
connections will be impacted by the mixes along their path.
Fig. 6 quantitatively shows the degradation of FTP goodput
for a mix using different batching strategies.
In Fig. 6, we compare FTP goodput between a simple
proxy strategy (s0 ) and other batching strategies
(s1 ; s2 ; . . . ; s7 ). We still use the network setup described in
Fig. 3. Similar to the experiments above, we configure the
noise traffic from S1 to R2 to carry 400 pps, and the cross
traffic from S1 to R1 to carry 500 pps. Together with the
100 pps carried by the flow of interest from S2 to R2 , both

TABLE 2
Nist-Net Parameters

output links of the mix carry 500 pps. Based on the
experiments and the results illustrated in Fig. 6, we make
the following observations:
1.
2.

3.

FTP goodput is decreased because of the use of
batching.
Different batching strategies have different impact on
the FTP goodput. In general, pool batching strategies
(strategies S5 -s7 ) cause a worse FTP goodput than
simple batching strategies (strategies s1 -s4 ).
When the batching in the mixes is excessively
aggressive, that is, when batching intervals are too
long or threshold values too high, the batching
interferes with the time-out behavior of TCP and
FTP, and in some cases, FTP aborts. This is the case,
in particular, for threshold-triggered mixes with no
cross traffic.

5.4 Network Emulation through Nist-Net
In this set of experiments, the delay boxes in Fig. 3 are
replaced by Nist-Net nodes [41] to emulate the effect of a
real network situation. The Nist-Net parameters are listed
in Table 2. The parameters for the Nist-Net nodes D1 and
D2 were gathered from statistics of ping packet traces from
Cleveland State University to ftp.linux.ncsu.edu and to
mirror.linux.duke.edu, respectively. The flow of interest is
limited to about 100 packet per second by Nist-Net.
Fig. 7 shows the detection rate for emulated networks
using the detection method based on mutual information.
We can observe that flow-correlation attacks approach a
100 percent detection rate when the sample size is
sufficiently large.
5.5 Mixes in Networks with Packet Losses
In this set of experiments, we study the impact of dropped
packets on flow-correlation attacks. Such packet loss can
occur in overloaded networks or in wireless settings where

Fig. 7. Detection rate for emulated networks (mix-based batching) using
mutual information.

environmental interference can cause packets to be dropped.
The packet-drop behavior is defined by controlling the
packet-drop probability in the Nist-Net nodes in Fig. 3.
Fig. 8 shows the detection rate when the network is
dropping packets. The mix strategy used in this set of
experiments is <s7 ; 10; 0:01; 10; 0:5>, that is, a timed
dynamic-pool Mix with pool size 10, batch size 10, batch
interval 10 msec, and forwarding probability 0.5. Based on
the results, we make the following observations:
1.
2.

The detection rate still approaches 100 percent when
the sample size is sufficiently large.
The results for small drop rates (5 percent or less)
appear to be no different than for no packet drops
at all. As expected, for larger drop rates (more than
5 percent) the detection rate is higher than for
lower drop rates. The reason for this is that a large
number of packet drops makes the timing footprint
of the TCP dynamics more obvious.

5.6 Mix Networks
Fig. 9 shows the network setup in this experiment. The
center part of the topologies used in experiments is the mix
cascade of different number of layers. Each sender on the
left side has four flows traversing the mix network. We
arrange paths of traffic flows so that each link in the cascade
has some number of traffic flows. To simulate the cross
traffic in the mix network, four larger aggregates of flows
are added to the mix network. According to the self-similar
nature of the network traffic [42], the high-volume cross
traffic is Pareto distributed. The configuration of the flows
through the six-layer cascade is shown in Table 3.
Fig. 10 shows the detection rate for topologies based on
mix cascades of different layers. We can observe that when
the sample size is sufficiently large, the detection rate
approaches 100 percent. In this set of experiments, the
detection rate for random guess is 18 since there are eight
potential receivers. So, even for small sample size such as

Fig. 8. Detection rate for network with packet loss.

Fig. 9. Experiment setup of mix network (six layers).

600 packets, flow-correlation attacks performs better than
random guess. We can also observe that the detection rate
of the topology of two-stage cascade is lower than other
topologies. The reason is that more layers of mix cascade
may make timing footprint of the TCP dynamics more
obvious.

Fig. 10. Detection rate for topologies of different layers.
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The basic idea is that FTP uses a loop-control mechanism.
For most of the life time, an FTP flow acts on the information
collected in each round trip time and thus demonstrates a
strong periodicity at the round trip time RTT.
Based on Lemma 6.1, we have the following theory for
the selection of sampling interval:

SAMPLING INTERVAL SELECTION

6.1 Theoretical Proof and Empirical Validation
From the discussion in Section 4.3 and from the evaluation
results above, we can see that frequency-analysis-based
flow-correlation attacks are very effective. The effectiveness
of the attack greatly depends on the careful selection of the
sampling interval, since we calculate the Fourier spectrum
over a set of packet average rates (i.e., the flow feature
vector) in the sampling interval. In this section, we discuss
how to select the sampling interval T in order to maximize
the effectiveness of flow-correlation attacks. We still use
FTP as an example for the discussion.
TABLE 3
Flow Configuration (Six Layers)

Lemma 6.1. An FTP flow with round trip time RT T has a
frequency component with the maximum power density at
1=RT T . This frequency component is denoted as the Feature
Frequency of the FTP flow. (Proof in the Appendix.)

Theorem 6.2. Assuming that a stable FTP flow on the input link
of a mix has a round trip time RT T , to detect the output link of
this FTP flow, we need to choose a sampling interval T smaller
than or equal to RT T =2, i.e.,
T<

RT T
:
2

ð9Þ

Proof. When we do sampling and calculate the average rate
of an FTP flow during the sampling interval, the process
corresponds to a zero-order hold [43] sampling process.
From Lemma 6.1, we know that an FTP flow’s feature
frequency is at 1=RT T , which we have to preserve for the
best effectiveness of flow-correlation attack. Nyquist’s
sampling theorem [43] tells us that to preserve this
feature frequency, the sampling rate 1=T should be at
least two times the feature frequency. That is,
1
1
>2
:
T
RT T

ð10Þ

Thus,
T<

RT T
:
2
t
u

Approximately, we can apply Theorem 6.2 to all the
strategies. Figs. 11 and 12 show detection rate in terms of
sampling interval. RTT of this FTP flow in question is
around 300 msec. We can see that the maximum detection
rate does happens at RT T =2 ¼ 150 msec.
In practice, we cannot use any sampling interval smaller
than half of RTT. There exists all kinds of interference from
mixes and operating systems, which may introduce highfrequency noise in frequency domain. We, therefore, prefer
to use a sample interval between ½RT T =4; RT T =2]. In this

Fig. 11. Detection rate in terms of sampling interval based on Matched Filter. (a) <s0 >. (b) <s2 ; 0:01>.

Fig. 12. Detection rate in terms of sampling interval based on Mutual Information. (a) <s0 >. (b) <s2 ; 0:01>.

way, the zero-order hold operator acts as a low-pass filter
with frequency response
"
( 2¥f T )#
T 2 sin
-j2¥f
2
2
:
ð11Þ
Hðf; TÞ ¼ e
2¥
The main lobe of jHðf; TÞj is in the range jfj < T1 . Thus, our
sampling process will smooth the original instantaneous
rate and remove a significant amount of noise. This in turn
helps the flow-correlation attack. Figs. 11 and 12 show the
influence of noise on detection rate: when T is much smaller
than RT T =2, the detection rate deteriorates.

6.2 Discussion
In practice, the adversary does not know the exact RTT of
the special flows in the system. Instead, she may need to a
priori investigate the mix network and get a rough picture
of possible TCP flow RTTs. The sampling interval can then
be chosen to be half of the smallest of the possible RTTs, or
simply the one that gives the best detection rate.
Figs. 11 and 12 also illustrate the complicated relationship
between detection rate and sampling interval: In addition to
the feature frequency component at 1=RT T , an FTP flow in
reality contains minor feature frequencies as well, which are
sufficient to differentiate an FTP flow from others. Fig. 13
gives an example of a power spectrum of an FTP flow.
For application-limited flows, such as ssh and much Web
traffic, the feature frequency is not determined by RTT.
Instead, it is determined by the application-level dynamics.
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methods used in mix networks were considered: seven
different packet batching strategies and two implementation
schemes, namely the link-based batching scheme and mixbased batching scheme. We found that mix networks that use
traditional batching strategies, regardless of the implemen
tation scheme, are vulnerable under flow-correlation attacks.
By using statistical analysis, an adversary can accurately
determine the output link used by traffic that comes to an
input flow of a mix. The detection rate can be as high as
100 percent as long as enough data are available. This is true
even if heavy cross traffic exists. The data collected in this
paper should give designers guidelines for the development
and operation of mix networks.
The failure of traditional mix batching strategies directly
leads us to the formulation of a new packet control method for
mixes in order to overcome their vulnerability to flowcorrelation attacks. Appropriate output control can achieve a
guaranteed low detection rate while maintaining high
throughput for normal payload traffic. Our claim is validated
by extensive performance data collected from experiments.

SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK

We have analyzed mix networks in terms of their effective
ness in providing anonymity and quality-of-service. Various

Fig. 13. Power spectrum of an FTP flow.

Fig. 14. TCP congestion window in congestion avoidance phase.

jXðwÞj2

We have shown that output control is flexible in controlling
the overhead by adjusting the maximum packet delay.

APPENDIX A
MAXIMUM FREQUENCY COMPONENT OF A TCP FLOW
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Based on [44], [45], the TCP flow
dynamics can approximately be illustrated as in Fig. 14 if
TCP-reno [46] version of congestion control algorithm is
used. When a TCP flow is in additive increase phase, one
more packet is sent each round trip time. While in
multiplicative decrease phase, the packet number in one
round trip time decreases by half from W to W2 . The
interdeparture time ( of two adjacent packets is
determined by the smallest bandwidth along the flow
path and jitter of queuing delay. Usually, ( is much
smaller than RTT.
So, we can model the TCP packet train in congestion
control phase as
W
2

W
2 þk-1

k¼0

l¼0

X X

xðtÞ ¼

8ðt - l . ( - k . RT T Þ;

ð12Þ

where 8ðtÞ is the unit impulse function.
Its Fourier transformation is
W

Xð!Þ ¼

k¼0

e

"
jXðwÞj ¼

W

k¼0

"

þ
¼

[3]

[4]

[8]

cosðk . RT T . ! þ l . ( . !Þ
[10]

l¼0
W
2

W
2 þk-1

k¼0

l¼0

X X
X

[2]

[9]

#2

W

þk-1
2
2X
X
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Its energy-density spectrum is as shown in (14).
Since ( « RT T , jl - nj < W , and ðl - nÞ( ! 0, (14) can be
approximated as follows:
2
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